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1 Abstrat
The theoretial desription of the evolution of ooperation presented by
Bergstrom [1℄ based on assortative mathing with partner hoie allows to
model the population dynamis in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma.
In this paper we present a short analysis of asymmetri eets brought into
the game by self knowledge of the partiipants, that is the knowledge of
one's own strategy. Within the same oneptual framework as introdued
by Bergstrom inlusion of selfknowledge leads to dierent behaviour of the
assortativity index and hanges in payos for dierent strategies.
2 Basi Assumptions and Notation
Sine the lassi works by Maynard Smith [2, 3℄ the evolutionary game the-
ory has been used in numerous appliations, ranging from biology, through
soiology to applied eonomis. One of the branhes of the disipline is the
mathing theory, whih deals with the situations where two separate sets of
players have to with eah other. Mathing theory an desribe elds as sex-
ual pairing, job market or even routing in omputer networks. The literature
dealing with mathing theory is quite rih, the introdution an be found in
the work of Roth and Sotomayor [4℄.
One of the interesting aspets of mathing is the inuene of intergroup
traits on the mathing proess. Suppose that there are some subsets within
eah of the two sets of players that are mathed. the question whether it
∗
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makes sense to inlude these subsets in analysis of the mathing, or, in other
words, whether there is any evolutionary advantage in mathing like with
like (or vie versa) has been given the name of assortativity mathing. This
paper is a diret extension of the analysis of assortative mathing presented
by Bergstrom [1℄. We would repeat a lot of the denitions and notations
used in that paper to allow to follow the reasoning and easily observe the
dierenes of the two approahes.
Following Bergstrom we assume that our population is divided between
two types of players, ooperators and defetors. The ratio of ooperators
within the population is x, orrespondingly for defetors it is 1− x.
The members of the population form pairs (math) with other members.
Assortativity of mathing results from dierene between of frequenies of
mathing between one's own type and with dierent type. The relative fre-
queny of mathings between various types of players depends on individuals'
types and proportions of their types within the population.
Let p(x) be the onditional probability that one enounters a ooperator,
given that one is a ooperator.
Let q(x) be the onditional probability that one enounters a ooperator,
given that one is a defetor.
Then, as argued in [1℄, the fration of all enounters between two indi-
viduals in whih a ooperator meets a defetor is x(1− p(x)). Similarly, the
fration of enounters in whih a defetor meets a ooperator is (1− x)q(x).
Sine these are just two dierent ways of ounting the same mathings we
have the initial equation:
x(1− p(x)) = (1− x)q(x) (1)
Bergstrom dened the index of assortativity, a(x) as a dierene between
probability of homogenous and heterogenous mathes.
a(x) = p(x)− q(x) (2)
By simple rearangements it is possible to express p(x) and q(x) through
x and a(x):
q(x) = x[1− (p(x)− q(x)] = x(1− a(x)) (3)
p(x) = a(x) + x(1− a(x)) (4)
2.1 Basi games senarios
Let's dene the general payo matrix for two partiipants, X and Y . Eah of
them has two possible hoies of behaviour, Cooperating (C) and Defeting
(D). The payos are dened as:
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Y = C Y = D
X = C R,R S, T
X = D T, S P, P
For the games onsidered here we assume that T ≥ R ≥ P ≥ S.
In this paper we would be assuming that the individual players use simple
strategies (i.e. not resorting to adaptive or time-dependant strategies, suh
as Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (RPD) games). Moreover, we would assume
that a player would aept a math when the expeted payo is greater than
or equal zero (assumption of rational behaviour). This means that if the
analysis, based on the information available to the player would show that
he is ertain to lose, the player would not math. This point would beome
important when we would start disussing the assortative mathing with
partner hoie.
Bergstrom has onsidered two types of games: prisoners Dilemma and
the Game of Shared Output. The analysis of assortativity applies to both
of them, but for simpliity we would onentrate on the game of Prisoners
Dilemma. Within this game the payo for player X is given by:
Both oooperate: R = b− c
X ooperates, Y defets: S = −c (S < 0!)
X defets, Y ooperates: T = b
Both defet: P = 0
where b is the benet onferred and c is the ost of ation, with b > c.
3 Mathing rules
As Bergstrom has noted, when partners have hoie about their partners and
mathing results from mutual onsent interesting possibilities arise. This
allows us to predit the index of assortativity. In the game of Prisoners
Dilemma everyone would prefer to be mathed with a ooperator rather
than with a defetor. In the simplest ase, if the players behaviour ould be
predited by observation with a 100% auray then the ooperators would
math with ooperators only (with payo of R)and defetors only with defe-
tors (with payo of P = 0). In this ase, regardless of x, p(x) = 1, q(x) = 0
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and, onsequently a(x) = 1. With R > P the only stable population would
be the one of all ooperators.
Bergstrom proposed a more general model, in whih the auray of de-
termination of partner type of behaviour is less than perfet. The proposed
model is based on labelling the players with an imperfet indiator of their
type (suh a s reputation based on partial information, behavioral ues or
a psyhologial test [1℄). We introdue notation in whih, for example, DC
denotes a true defetor labelled and pereived as ooperator (good heater),
CC denotes true and reognizable ooperator, CD a ooperator unfortunately
mislabelled as defetor and DD a defetor unable to 'hide' his harater.
Within the population of ooperators we have a fration α of orretly
labelled ones (CC) and fration (1−α) of ooperators mislabelled as defetors
CD. Within the population of defetors we would have a fration β of or-
retly labelledDD and fration (1−β) of defetors mislabelled as ooperators
(DC). Bergstrom proposed that labelling should be `reasonably reliable', i.e.
α, β > 1/2, we would study the whole range of 0 < α, β < 1.
Beause the deisions of the players would be based on what they assume
about the other players (the labels) rather than the real situation the outome
of the mathing (payo matrix) beomes less trivial.
Bergstrom assumed a ruial simpliation in partner aeptane rules, in
whih `apparent ooperators will all be mathed with apparent ooperators and
apparent defetors would be mathed with apparent defetors'. This allowed
to alulate the index of assortativity for any x.
The assumption above does not, however, apply to the situation when
the players are selfknowledgeable, that is when any player `knows' his `true
nature'. In suh situation true ooperators  even those labelled as defetors
 would shirk from mathing with pereived defetors. This would reate
quite ompliated mutual onsent rules and payo matrix whih are presented
in several tables in Appendix 1. The ases where the mutual onsent is
marked by YES
∗
are speial in the sense of additional level of selfknowledge,
possible to be added, namely the knowledge of other's reation to one's own
label. For example in the ase X = CD and Y = DC , X , knowing he looks
like a defetor might wonder why an apparent ooperator would want to
math with him. The only rational explanation being that Y is in fat a
true defetor, X would then rationalise not to math with Y . Suh in depth
analysis of 'I know that you know that I know . . . ' is beyond the sope of
the urrent analysis.
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3.1 Calulation of relative frequenies and assortative
index
In this setion we will ompare the alulated values of p(x), q(x) and a(x)
for both the Bergstrom model and Selfknowledge model.
Following Bergstrom we have:
pB(x) =
α2x
αx+ (1− β)(1− x)
+
(1− α)2x
(1− α)x+ β(1− x)
(5)
qB(x) =
(1− β)αx
αx+ (1− β)(1− x)
+
β(1− α)x
(1− α)x+ β(1− x)
(6)
aB(x) = (α + β − 1)
(
αx
αx+ (1− β)(1− x)
+
(1− α)x
(1− α)x+ β(1− x)
)
(7)
For the selfknowledge model the probabilities are:
pS(x) =
α2x
αx+ (1− β)(1− x)
(8)
qS(x) = (1− β)x (9)
aS(x) =
α2x
αx+ (1− β)(1− x)
− (1− β)x (10)
Figure 1 in Appendix 2 ompares aB(x) and aS(x) for α = 3/4 and
β = 3/5. One an immediately see the dierene in behaviour of a(x) in the
region of x ≈ 1. To understand the meaning of the dierenes it is useful to
onsider the limiting ases for both models.
Bergstrom Selfknowledge
p(x) in the limit x→ 0
pB(x) ≈ x
(
α2
1−β
+ (1−α)
2
β
)
pS(x) ≈ x
(
α2
1−β
)
q(x) in the limit x→ 0
qB(x) ≈ x qS(x) ≈ x(1 − β)
p(x) in the limit x→ 1
pB(x) ≈ 1− (1− x) pS(x) ≈ α− (1− x)(1− β)
q(x) in the limit x→ 1
qB(x) ≈ 1− (1− x)
(
β2
1−α
+ (1−β)
2
α
)
qS(x) ≈ (1− β)− (1− x)(1− β)
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The intuitive explanation of the limiting ases is quite instrutive. Lets
onsider rst the x → 0. In Bergstrom's model pB(x) is proportional to x,
with two terms orresponding to two situations: real ooperator laballed as
ooperator mathes real ooperator laballed as ooperator and real ooper-
ator laballed as defetor mathes with real ooperator laballed as defetor.
Taking selfknowledge into aount the seond type of math is not allowed,
as selfknowledgeable ooperator would not math with apparent defetor,
thus pS(x) has only one term.
For q(x) in the limit of small x , Bergstrom's model gives qB(x) ≈ x. This
orresponds to the situation where every defetor (either DC or DD) would
nd a ooperator (respetively CC and CD). In the selfknowledge model only
the defetors posing as ooperators would nd willing ooperators, and thus
qS(x) ≈ x(1− β).
Despite quantitative dierenes both model preserve linaerity of p(x) and
q(x) for small x. For x approahing 1 their behaviour is however drastially
dierent. Bergstrom's model predits both funtions to approah 1, so that
their dierene, a(x) is again linear in (1 − x). The selfknowledge model
gives a dierent predition. As x→ 1 pS(x) approahes α. This orresponds
to an intuition that when there are almost no defetors, only the apparent
ooperators would nd willing partners. Those 'unfortunate' to be labelled
as defetors, despite their true nature would remain unmathed. For x→ 1
we have qS(x) → 1 − β. This may be explained as follows: from the small
number of defetors all heaters labelled as ooperators would surely nd a
math of a ooperator. More importantly, the linear terms in expansion of
both pS(x) and qS(x) for x approahing 1 are the same, namely (1−x)∗(1−β).
They anel out leaving aS(x) ≈ α + β − 1 +O(x
2).
4 Comparison of payos
Before we would summarize the results of the disussed models lets introdue
the payo funtions for ooperators and defetors and their dierene δ(x).
This dierene would then determine the dynamis of the population.
The payo for a ooperator is given by:
p(x)R + (1− p(x))S = S + p(x)(R− S) (11)
= S + a(x)(R− S) + x(1− a(x))(R− S).
Similar reasoning gives the payo for a defetor:
q(x)T + (1− q(x))P = P + x(1− a(x))(T − P ). (12)
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The dierene between payos is
δ(x) = S − P + a(x)(R − S) + x(1 − a(x))[(R + P )− (S + T )]. (13)
For additive Prisoners Dilemma games (R + P )− (S + T ) = 0 and
δ(x) = S − P + a(x)(R − S) = a(x)b − c, (14)
where we have used the notation from Setion 2. In the following we would
study only suh additive games.
In Bergstrom's model aB(x) for all values of α and β has zero values for
x = 0 and x = 1. For the range of values onsidered in [1℄ i.e. α, β > 1/2,
the index of assortativity aB(x) is a onave funtion. It is interesting to
observe that this property is preserved for all values of α and β, with the
exeption of situation when α+ β = 11. This allows to extend the results of
Bergstrom to quite interesting situation of invasion of 'very good heaters'
into ooperators population. In suh situation x ≈ 1, β < 1/2 and hanging
α does not introdue qualitative impat. As may be seen from Figure 2
even for β < 1/2 the onave harater of the aB(x) is preserved. This
means that the onave harater of δB(x) = aB(x)b− c is also preserved. If
c > max(a(x)b) then δB(x) < 0 and proportion of defetors inreases, due to
their higher payo. There is only one stable point: all players are defetors.
For c < max(a(x)b) as presented in [1℄ δB(x) < 0 for ertain x1 < x < x2,
and there are two stable equilibria: x = 0  all defetors and x = x2  mixed
population of defetors and ooperators (see Figure 4).
In the selfknowledge model the situation is dierent. For ertain values of
b, c, suh as c > max(a(x)b), as before, the proportion of defetors inreases,
due to their higher payo. There is only one stable point: all players are
defetors.
When α + β − 1 < 0 we have aS(x) < 0 for all x. In suh a ase,
regardless of the payo oeients b and c defetors benet always surpasses
ooperators benet and δS(x) < 0 for all x. The only equilibrium is at x = 0
(see Figure 5).
When α+β− 1 > 0 the assortativity index inreases monotonially with
x, and for c < max(a(x)b) there is a region of x > x1 where δS(x) > 0. Two
stable equilibria form depending on initial parameters, one at x = 0 and one
at x = 1.
Interpretation of the above results based on ommon sense reasoning is
as follows.
For α + β ≪ 1 we have relatively large number of `mislabelled' play-
ers, both ooperators and defetors. In suh situation ooperators are at
1
For the ase of α+ β = 1 we have aB(x) ≡ 0 for all x
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disadvantage: they would not want to math with anyone `looking like' a
defetor dereasing the number of mathes with true ooperators, while still
being prone to fall for a heating defetor. Defetors, on the other hand, see
little to lose in mathing with presumed defetor and willingly math with
presumed ooperators. Thus the negative value of a(x) and following it the
greater payo for defetors.
For α+β ≫ 1 there are relatively few mislabelled haraters. For large x,
as most of the small number of defetors look as defetors, the pure strategy
of ooperators is atually beneial. There are no mathes suh as CD (o-
operator labelled as defetor) willing to math with DD (orretly labelled
defetor)  and suh mathes were allowed in Bergstrom model. Thus the
dierene in the preditions of the two models. The defetors mathing with
defetors are at payo disadvantege to ooperators mathing with oopera-
tors and eventually vanish from population.
On the other hand, for small x and α+β ≫ 1 the few ooperators present,
surrounded by many orretly labelled defetors an math only within their
group (αx) or with the mislabelled defetors (1 − β)(1 − x)  the other
situation resulting in severly disadvantageous outome. Here the only stable
population is that of defetors only.
A few words should be said about the validity of the two models for
α + β ≈ 1. For both models this hoie of parameters yields a(x) ≈ 0
for all x. Moreover, the funtion a(x) is very at, and for α + β = 1 this
funtion is equal to 0 for all x. the validity of preditions for both models
are questionable for suh ase and the dynamis of the population should be
determined by fators not taken into aount.
4.1 Conlusions
In this short analysis we have extended the theoretial model proposed by
Bergstrom, whih allowed not only to analyse the results of assortative math-
ing (i.e. preferable mathing of similar players among themselves) but also
to alulate the assortativity index a(x). The new model takes into a-
ount inuene of the selfknowledge of the players on their hoies. It has
been shown that for ertain values of the population omposition (dened by
numbers of ooperators and defetors and proportions of these populations
`orretly' labelled) the stable points predited by Bergstrom's model and
the selfknowledge model dier qualitatively, the latter model leading only to
`pure' populations of all defetors or all ooperators.
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Appendix 1: Mathing tables for Selfknowledge
model and for the Bergstrom model
Tables for the Selfknowledge model
Cooperator  Cooperator with selfknowledge
X Y Fration Consent Payo X Payo Y Reasoning
CC CC α
2x2 YES b− c+ k b− c+ k Full agreement of pereived
and real behaviour
CC CD α(1 − α)x
2
NO   X would not agree to pair
with Y , beause Y looks like
D
CD CC (1− α)αx
2
NO   Y would not agree to pair with
X, beause X looks like D
CD CD (1− α)
2x2 NO   Neither would agree to pair
with the other: 'I know I am
a C, why would I pair with
someone who looks like D'
Defetor  Defetor with selfknowledge
X Y Fration Consent Payo X Payo Y Reasoning
DC DC (1− β)
2(1− x)2 YES 0 0 Both would agree with hopes
of heating the other
DD DD β
2(1− x)2 YES 0 0 Both would agree on prinipe
of 'it would not hurt'
DD DC β(1− β)(1 − x)
2
YES 0 0 X would agree with hope of
heating Y , Y on prinipe of
'it would not hurt'
DC DD β(1− β)(1 − x)
2
YES 0 0 Y would agree with hope of
heating X, X on prinipe of
'it would not hurt'
Tables for the Selfknowledge model
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Cooperator  Defetor with selfknowledge
X Y Fration Consent Payo X Payo Y Reasoning
CC DC α(1− β)x(1 − x) YES −c b Both would agree, X
genuinely, Y as heater
DC CC α(1− β)x(1 − x) YES b −c Both would agree, Y
genuinely, X as heater
CC DD αβx(1 − x) NO   X would not agree
DD CC αβx(1 − x) NO   Y would not agree
CD DD (1− α)βx(1 − x) NO   X would not agree
DD CD (1− α)βx(1 − x) NO   Y would not agree
CD DC (1− α)(1 − β)x(1− x) YES
∗ −c b X would agree pereiv-
ing Y as C, Y would
agree in the spirit 'it
would not hurt'
DC CD (1− α)(1 − β)x(1− x) YES
∗ b −c Y would agree pereiv-
ing X as C, X would
agree in the spirit 'it
would not hurt'
Cooperator  Cooperator Bergstrom
X Y Fration Consent Payo X Payo Y Reasoning
CC CC α
2x2 YES b− c+ k b− c+ k apparent ooperator ONLY
with apparent ooperator
CC CD α(1 − α)x
2
NO   NO mixed labels
CD CC (1− α)αx
2
NO   NO mixed labels
CD CD (1− α)
2x2 YES b− c+ k b− c+ k apparent defetor ONLY with
apparent defetor
Defetor  Defetor Bergstrom
X Y Fration Consent Payo X Payo Y Reasoning
DC DC (1− β)
2(1− x)2 YES 0 0 apparent ooperator ONLY
with apparent ooperator
DD DD β
2(1− x)2 YES 0 0 apparent defetor ONLY with
apparent defetor
DD DC β(1− β)(1 − x)
2
NO   NO mixed labels
DC DD β(1− β)(1 − x)
2
NO   NO mixed labels
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Cooperator  Defetor Bergstrom
X Y Fration Consent Payo X Payo Y Reasoning
CC DC α(1− β)x(1 − x) YES −c b apparent ooperator
ONLY with apparent
ooperator
DC CC α(1− β)x(1 − x) YES b −c apparent ooperator
ONLY with apparent
ooperator
CC DD αβx(1 − x) NO   NO mixed labels
DD CC αβx(1 − x) NO   NO mixed labels
CD DD (1− α)βx(1 − x) YES −c b apparent defetor
ONLY with apparent
defetor
DD CD (1− α)βx(1 − x) YES b −c apparent defetor
ONLY with apparent
defetor
CD DC (1− α)(1 − β)x(1− x) NO   NO mixed labels
DC CD (1− α)(1 − β)x(1− x) NO   NO mixed labels
12
Appendix 2: Figures
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Figure 1: Comparison of assortativity indexes for Bergrstrom model and for
model with selfknowledge. Values used in alulation: α = 3/4, β = 3/5.
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Figure 2: Assortativity index aB for Bergrstom model as a funtion of x and
β. Values used in alulation: α = 0.8; it is worth noting that for β = 0.2
aB ≡ 0.
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Figure 3: Assortativity index for Selfknowledge model as a funtion of x and
β. Values used in alulation: α = 0.8; it is worth noting that for β = 0.2
aS ≡ 0.
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Figure 4: Example of dierene between payos δ(x) for Bergstrom model.
Two stable equilibria at x = 0 and x = x2 form. Values used in alulation:
α = 0.8, β = 0.8, b = 10, c = 1. Arrows indiate diretion of evolution of
populations.
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Figure 5: Example of dierene between payos δ(x) for Selfknowledge model
with α+β < 1 . Only one stable equilibrium at x = 0 is present. Values used
in alulation: α = 0.4, β = 0.4, b = 10, c = 1. Arrows indiate diretion of
evolution of populations.
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Figure 6: Example of dierene between payos δ(x) for selfknowledge model
with α + β > 1 . Two stable equilibria at x = 0 and x = 1 are present.
Values used in alulation: α = 0.8, β = 0.8, b = 10, c = 1. Arrows indiate
diretion of evolution of populations.
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